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Cochran, Jr.: Which "Client-Centered Counselors"?: A Reply to Professor Freedma

WHICH "CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELORS"?:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR FREEDMAN
Robert F. Cochran,Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I am honored to have been asked to participate in the fortieth
anniversary issue of the Hofstra Law Review and to respond to the
comments of Professor Monroe Freedman. I have long admired
Professor Freedman. Teresa Collett and I use several of his articles in
our legal ethics casebook,' and I consider him to be one of the most
thoughtful legal ethics commentators. More often than not, I agree with
Professor Freedman. Invariably, he causes me to think more deeply
about the important work that lawyers do for clients. I am particularly
honored to join a conversation that began over three decades ago
between Professor Freedman and our mutual friend (and my teacher,
mentor, and co-author), Professor Thomas Shaffer.2 In most of what I
say about legal ethics, I am merely a poor echo of Professor Shaffer's
thought.3
*

Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law and Director of the Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar

Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & TERESA S. COLLETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE

LEGAL PROFESSION 25-28, 31-33, 133-36, 156-59 (2d ed. 2003) (excerpting MONROE H.
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 3.03, at 52-55, § 3.04, at 56,
§ 3.08, at 69-70 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE II] (arguing for client

autonomy and lawyer advocacy)); Monroe Freedman, Must You Be the Devil's Advocate?, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at 19; Monroe Freedman, The EthicalIllusion of Screening, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1995, at 24; Monroe Freedman, The Morality of Lawyering, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993,
at 22.
2. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U. L.
REV. 331 (1987) (disagreeing with Professor Shaffer's arguments); Monroe H. Freedman, Personal
Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 204 (1978) [hereinafter
Freedman, PersonalResponsibility] (arguing that "the attorney acts both professionally and morally
in assisting clients to maximize their autonomy"); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good
Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319 (1987) (responding to Professor Freedman's position).
3. Much of what appears herein is more fully developed in THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT
F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 18-25 (2d ed. 2009).
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I have been asked specifically to respond to Professor Freedman's
comments concerning the luncheon speech that I gave at the Campbell
Law Review symposium in the spring of 2011.4 In that speech, I
criticized what I call "liberal lawyering" for its tendency to focus
exclusively on the interests of clients, often at the expense of other
people.5 It was a luncheon speech, so I painted in broad strokes, without
the fine distinctions that might be drawn in a typical law review article. I
spoke in general terms about the position of the "client-centered"
counselors 6 and I failed to identify an important respect in which
Professor Freedman differs from the dominant position of the clientcentered counselors. I welcome this opportunity to fill in some of the
details. In this response, I hope to generate a conversation among those
who identify themselves as client-centered lawyers as to the very
significant differences between them in the matter of lawyer-client moral
discourse. Finally, I will address the question raised in Professor
Freedman's article (one that quite obviously is of concern to him): How
can it be that his colleague and others, in the face of Professor
Freedman's consistent and long-time advocacy of lawyer-client moral
discourse, could conclude that he would favor a lawyer (as in Kramer vs.
Kramer) who7 aggressively attacks the opposing party without client
concurrence?

II. CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELORS, COLLABORATIVE COUNSELORS,
AND MORAL DISCOURSE

As Professor Freedman notes in his piece, he and I agree about the
importance of lawyers engaging clients in moral discourse about matters
in legal representation. 8 He notes that Professor Shaffer and I, in our
book Lawyers, Clients, and Moral Responsibility, cite examples of
thoughtful lawyer moral counsel from Professor Freedman's own law
practice. 9 In my view, this area of agreement on the importance of moral
discourse is far more significant for the day-to-day practice of lawyers
than our areas of disagreement.

4. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Enlightenment Liberalism, Lawyers, and the Future of LawyerClient Relations, 33 CAMPBELL L. REv. 685 (2011).
5. Id. at 687-88.
6. See id. at 687-89.
7.

Monroe H. Freedman, Client-CenteredLawyering-What It Isn't, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV.

349, 349-50 (2011).
8. Id. at 352.
9. See id. at 353 (citing SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 3, at 25-26).
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With the exception of the phrase below in italics, Professor
Freedman favorably quotes my description of the collaborative school of
client counseling10 to which Professor Shaffer and I ascribe:
[T]he relationship between lawyer and client should be a collaborative
one.... Lawyers should advise clients about moral issues that arise in
representation in the way that friends advise friends, raising such issues
for serious discussion, but not imposing their will on the
client.... One of the best ways to raise moral concerns in the law
office is by asking questions which come naturally in the course of
decision-making. As to each alternative under consideration, the
lawyer can ask the client, "What will be its effect on other people?"
The lawyer and client should consider all of the consequences that
might arise from various alternatives, not (as with client-centered
lawyers) merely the consequences to the client. The lawyer might also
ask, "What would be fair?" Such questions call on clients to draw on
their own sources of moral values.IProfessor Freedman has advocated this position for several
decades. 12 In his words (from 1978), lawyers should counsel their clients
"regarding. . . moral responsibilities as the lawyer perceives them."'1 3
Indeed, his arguments (along with those of Professor Shaffer) persuaded
me to adopt this position. Note that in collaborative client counseling, as
in Professor Freedman's client counseling, moral discourse occurs
throughout the decision-making process. It is present from the time that
the consequences of various alternatives are identified through the
client's choice among the alternatives.
Professor Freedman's objection to my statement quoted above is
that I contrast moral counsel with the practice of the "client-centered
counselors." 14 I confess that my statement would have been more
10. For a more detailed discussion of the collaborative approach to client counseling, see
generally ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE
APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING

(2d ed. 2006), and

SHAFFER & COCHRAN,

supra note 3, at 42-86.
11. Freedman, supra note 7, at 352-53 (emphasis added) (quoting Cochran, supra note 4, at
690, 692) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 50-53 (1990)
[hereinafter FREEDMAN, ULE 1]; Freedman, PersonalResponsibility, supra note 2, at 199-201. In
Professor Freedman's comments on my Campbell Law Review lecture, he takes me to task for citing
to the first edition of his book, rather than the most recent edition. Freedman, supra note 7, at 351.
At various places in my lecture, I cite to various editions of his text. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note
4, at 687 nn.5-6, 689 n.15. My practice generally is to cite to the edition of a text in vAhich I first
learned of the author's position on the cited issue. On the primary question at issue herein, Professor
Freedman has maintained strong support for lawyer-client moral discourse throughout the editions
of his book.
13. Freedman, PersonalResponsibility, supranote 2, at 204.
14. See Freedman, supranote 7, at 352-53.
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accurate had I contrasted the collaborative view with the dominant
position of the client-centered counselors. Professor Freedman argues
that my description above of collaborative lawyering is also "a good
summary of client-centered lawyering."' 5 However, Professor Freedman
and his co-author, Professor Abbe Smith, appear to be alone among the
client-centered counselors in supporting the idea of moral counsel as an
integral part of the decision-making process. I am pleased that my
description above is a good summary of Professor Freedman's view of
lawyering, but it is not the view of the vast majority of client-centered
lawyers.
Professor Freedman first publicly adopted the "client-centered"
label for his theory of lawyering in 2002 in the second edition of his
Understanding Lawyers' Ethics, in which he was joined by Professor
Smith. 16 At the point at which he adopted that label, the "client-centered"
school of legal counseling was well-established and explicitly rejected
moral counsel as a part of the decision-making process.17
The founders of "client-centered" legal counseling include
Professors David Binder, Susan Price, Paul Bergman, Robert Bastress,
and Joseph Harbaugh. 18 "Client-centered" lawyering, as defined by
them, focuses on the desires of the client.1 9 They argue that because
client autonomy is of paramount importance, "decisions should be made
on the basis of what choices are most likely to provide clients with
maximum satisfaction.,20 The lawyer should not act in ways that would
influence the client's choice. The lawyer should be "neutral" 2 and
15. Id at 353.
16. Compare FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE II, supra note 1, at vii, with FREEDMAN, ULE I,
supra note 12, at ix.
17. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers andClients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 774 (1987).
18. See generally ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING,
COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 26-32 (1990)

(presenting the "person-centered" approach of legal counseling); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 1-13 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II] (identifying the central components of client-centered
counseling); DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A

CLENT-CENTERED APPROACH 147-53 (1977) (advocating a client-centered approach to decision
making). Paul Tremblay joined the Binder group for the 2004 edition and Ian S. Weinstein for the
2011 edition. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS III].
19. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 18, at 256; BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS II, supra note 18, at 3; BINDER & PRICE, supranote 18, at 147-49.
20. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 18, at 272; BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS III, supra note 18, at 318. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 18,

at 256.
21. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 18, at 300; BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS III, supranote 18, at 346. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 18, at 166. In
his response to my Campbell Law Review speech, Professor Freedman emphasizes that his form of
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"nonjudgmental. 22 The lawyer should express empathy for the client's
feelings, because "[y]ou communicate respect through... accurate
empathy; your understanding of the client's feelings and experiences
necessarily implies that the client has acted, or reacted, in a way that is
natural and appropriate. That is, the client's feelings and experiences are
'understandable.' ' 23 (As Stephen Ellmann has noted, "[i]t is hard to
escape the conclusion that what is 'natural and appropriate,' and thus
'understandable,' is also 'right."'' 24)
When a decision is to be made in legal representation, these clientcentered lawyer advocates suggest that the lawyer and client list on a
sheet of paper all of the alternative courses of action and the potential
consequences of each.25 Under the Bastress and Harbaugh model, the
consequences are labeled "consequences for client., 2 6 The lawyer asks
probing questions that will help the lawyer and client to more fully
understand the consequences
for the client.21 The client then decides
28
alternatives.
the
among
The client-centered emphasis on client interests, at the possible
expense of the interests of other people, is illustrated by an example in
the Bastress and Harbaugh book. They suggest that prior to a counseling
session, the lawyer prepare a counseling plan. 29 The hypothetical case
that introduces and illustrates their method involves Ralph Kratzer, a
long-time friend and neighbor of the client. 30 Kratzer has opened a bar in
the client's neighborhood, which may violate a zoning ordinance. 3'
Bastress and Harbaugh set up a portion of the counseling plan as
follows:

client-counseling is not "neutral." Freedman, supra note 7, at 351-52. In this respect, he differs with
the dominant position among client-centered lawyers.
22.

23.
(1992).
24.

BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 18, at 57.

Id. at 130, quoted in Stephen Ellmann, Empathy andApproval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 993
Ellmann, supra note 23, at 993.

25. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 18, at 301; BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS III, supra note 18, at 345-46; BINDER & PRICE, supra note 18, at 184.
See, e.g., BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supranote 18, at 246-48.
26. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 18, at 246.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id.at 236.
See id.
Id. at 237-41.
Id. at241.
See id.
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Alternative

Consequences for
Client

Probing Subjects

File Civil
Action

Strain on relationship
with Kratzer

How important to the client 32
is
his friendship with Kratzer?

The counseling plan then lists several other potential consequences
to the client of filing a civil action, but there is no mention of the effect
of the action on Kratzer. 33 The consequences to Kratzer of the client's
filing suit are to be considered solely in light of the effect that they will
have on the client; Kratzer has no independent moral significance. The
plan suggests that if Kratzer were not a friend, or if the client's
friendship with Kratzer were not seen by the client as important, Kratzer
would not be worthy of consideration.
Despite the claim among most client-centered counselors that their
methods are "neutral," this method of decision-making is likely to
influence clients to make self-serving choices. Under the dominant
method of client-centered counseling, the lawyer and client consider
alternatives in light of "consequences for the client," not consequences
for others.
The client is likely to look to the lawyer to take the lead in the
lawyer-client relationship, and if the lawyer identifies some
considerations that are important (consequences to the client) and fails to
identify other considerations (consequences to other people), the client is
likely to assume that consequences to other people are not important. Far
from being neutral, during decision-making, these client-centered
methods steer clients to make self-serving choices.34
Though most client-centered counselors do not raise moral concerns
during the decision-making process, they do allow for lawyer
conscientious objection once the client has made a decision. They allow
lawyers to challenge client decisions that they believe to be morally
repugnant and to withdraw if clients maintain their position. 35 The
32. Id. at 246.
33.

See id.

34. Binder and Price, in their 1977 book, suggest that lawyers and clients consider "social
consequences," but the focus is on the consequences to the client of effects on other people. BINDER
& PRICE, supra note 18, at 145. In all of the examples they give of lawyers and clients considering
"social consequences," the focus is on the consequences to the client. See, e.g., id. at 138-39, 145,
151. In the 2004 book from the Binder group, the authors note that if clients "fail to recognize that
one or more of their possible alternatives may have a substantial positive or negative impact on third
parties or society in general.... [Y]ou may well want to call such possibilities to their attention."
BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supranote 18, at 308. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS
AS COUNSELORS III, supra note 18, at 406-07.
35. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 18, at 334-35; BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
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lawyer's conscience might legitimately come into play when the client
makes a decision that the lawyer believes is morally wrong.16 "[C]lientcenteredness need not cause you to wholly abandon your moral
commitments. When clients opt for courses of action that you believe are
morally repugnant (though lawful), self-respect for your own autonomy
may make it appropriate for you [to] ask them to reconsider their
decisions. 37
Professor Shaffer and I have raised concerns with this form of
moral discourse:
First, client-centered counselors' moral discourse comes into play only
when the lawyer feels that the client wants to do something that is
"morally repugnant." Morality (in and out of the law office) is not
generally a matter of choosing whether to do something that is morally
wrong; more often it is a choice between something that is better and
something that is worse. It may not be often that the client will make a
choice that the lawyer feels is "morally repugnant," but clients
constantly are faced with issues that have moral implications. We feel
that those moral implications should be considered during the decisionmaking process.
There is an unjustified finality in the lawyer's moral impulse as it is
described by the client-centered counselors. There is too much lonely
independence in it. It is too little like the ordinary conversations we
have with family, friends, and associates about what to do. In ordinary
conversation we propose, try out, suggest, and listen. We rarely issue
moral pronouncements arrived at "independently" and outside of
ordinary, tentative, mutual conversation. We are not ordinarily
conscientious objectors in our relationships with other people.
Second, we think that the method of moral discourse suggested by
the client-centered counselors is likely to be ineffective. The client is
likely to feel a sense of betrayal after the lawyer leads the client to
consider a decision in terms of narrow client interest, and then
challenges the client's decision. The client may well feel that the
lawyer was involved in making the decision and has in some
significant way become committed to it. In addition, when clients have
COUNSELORS 11,supra note 18, at 292-95; BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II1, supra
note 18, at 338-41.
36.

BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 18, at 334-35; BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS

COUNSELORS II, supra note 18, at 293-95; BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS III, supra
note 18, at 339. Binder and Price's earlier counseling book provides no place for moral counsel. See
BINDER & PRICE, supra note 18, at 138, 144 (categorizing the nonlegal consequences that will arise
upon choosing a given course of action as economic, social, and psychological, but omitting moral
consequences).
37.

BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 18, at 293. See BINDER ET AL.,

LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS III, supra note 18, at 339.
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decided what to do following a counseling session, it is unlikely that
they will admit that they were wrong. Once it is made, they are likely
to grow in their commitment to the decision. Finally, lawyers are likely
to recognize the futility of such a challenge and not even make the
effort. After lawyers encourage the client to see things from the client's
perspective and the client makes a decision, it will be difficult for
lawyers to shift gears and reverse the direction of the counseling.
Morals at that point seem too much like an intrusion on "legal
business."38
Here, as I did in my Campbell Law Review speech, Professor
Shaffer and I may have painted with too broad a brush. We describe the
dominant client-centered counseling position, one that is not shared by
Professor Freedman. As we note in our book, Professor Freedman shares
our view that moral discourse should be an integral part of the clientcounseling decision-making process.39
III.

"MIS-UNDERSTANDING FREEDMAN'S ETHICS"
WHY IS IT So COMMON?

:40

Professor Freedman begins his comment on my speech with the
story of one of his colleagues who showed his students a clip from the
movie Kramer vs. Kramer. In the film, the father's lawyer tells the father
that he is going to "play rough" in the custody fight, and he proceeds to
do so. 41 Professor Freedman notes:
The lawyer at no time makes any effort to counsel the client about the
nature of hard-fought custody litigation, to suggest either an effort at
conciliation with the mother or an amicable arrangement for sharing
time with the child,
or to seek
•
• out
42 the client's true feelings and desires
about possible courses of action.
Following the film clip, Professor Freedman's colleague told his
students (to the distress of Professor Freedman) that the Kramer vs.

38. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 3, at 24-25 (footnote omitted). See THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 23-24
(1994).
39. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
40. This is a play on the title of Professor Freedman's book, UnderstandingLawyers' Ethics.
See Teresa Stanton Collett, UnderstandingFreedman'sEthics, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 455 (1991).
41. KRAMER VS. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979).
42. Freedman, supra note 7, at 349. The Kramer vs. Kramer lawyer is an example of what
Professor Shaffer and I have labeled the "godfather lawyer," a lawyer who attacks the opposing
party on behalf of the client, whether or not the client wants the lawyer to do so. See SHAFFER &
COCHRAN, supra note 3, at 7-10, 13-15.
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Kramer lawyer's representation "is client-centered lawyering, which is
favored by my colleague, Professor Freedman. 43
How can it be that Professor Freedman's colleague, in the face of
Professor Freedman's consistent and decades-long advocacy of lawyerclient moral discourse, assumed that Professor Freedman would favor
the Kramer vs. Kramer representation? One who has read Professor
Freedman carefully will know that this sort of representation is
inconsistent with his position. And yet, I believe that Professor
Freedman's colleague is representative of many (if not most) law
students, lawyers, and law professors who know of Professor
Freedman's work. They would be surprised to learn that Professor
Freedman advocates lawyer-client moral discourse. In this concluding
section, I will briefly address two possible reasons for this
misperception. Lawyers assume that Professor Freedman will always
favor aggressive lawyer advocacy because he adopts "client-centered" as
the label for his school of legal representation, and he consistently
identifies "client autonomy" as the goal of that representation.
A.

"Client-Centered"Representation

Professor Freedman and the other client-centered counselors have
chosen a name for their school of lawyering that suggests that lawyers
pursue client interests, irrespective of the harm that they might cause to
others. Labels are important. The term "client-centered" suggests that
legal representation should center around the client. The client is in the
center; other people (like Mr. Kramer's wife and child) are on the
periphery. The representation is all about the client. Moreover, the term
"client-centered" is likely to be understood by the reader (whether
consciously or not) as a play on the term "self-centered." We generally
do not like self-centered people. They always seek their way. Why
should lawyers create self-centered clients?
I realize that the term "client-centered" and its theory were
originally designed to shift law practice away from being "lawyercentered," to change the common practice of lawyers being in charge of
legal representation. 44 But the common perception of client-centered
43. Freedman, supra note 7, at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted). Professor Freedman's
colleague misunderstood not only Freedman's position, but that of the other client-centered
counselors as well. They argue that the lawyer should operate at the direction of the client. See
supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
44.

See generally DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?

(1974) (advocating a move away from the traditional approach of professional predominant control,
and toward a participatory approach where clients share control and decision responsibility with the
professional).
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lawyering is that it advocates that decisions in the representation be
made solely in the client's interests. As I noted earlier in this Article, the
client-counseling structure advocated by most client-centered counselors
reinforces that perception. 45 If Professor Freedman and other clientcentered counselors want lawyers and clients to consider the interests of
other people who might be affected by their representation, they might
consider another name for their school of client counseling. The current
name suggests that it is all about the client.
B.

"ClientAutonomy"

A second reason that Professor Freedman's advocacy of moral
counsel is often overlooked is his insistence that "client autonomy" is the
ultimate end of legal representation. In an oft-quoted section from
Professor Freedman's 1978 article and each edition of his Understanding
Lawyers' Ethics, he couples his call for lawyer-client moral discourse
with the following: "One of the essential values of a just society is
respect for the dignity of each member of that society. Essential to each
individual's dignity is the free exercise of his autonomy.... [T]he
and morally in assisting clients to
attorney acts both professionally
'4 6
maximize their autonomy.
There is ambiguity in Professor Freedman's use of the term
"autonomy." In this and other statements, it is not entirely clear whether
he is advocating client autonomy vis-a-vis only the lawyer or client
autonomy vis-A-vis other people as well (for example, a client's
neighbors, community, employees, or Mr. Kramer's wife and child).
Again, I favor client control of the representation, but autonomy vis-Avis the other people in the client's life should not necessarily be the end
of the representation.
Note that in the quotation from Professor Freedman just above, he
argues that client autonomy is important because it is "[e]ssential to each
individual's dignity." Client dignity is the primary goal; client autonomy
is a means to that end. However, Professor Freedman gives little or no
attention to other aspects of client dignity. As Professor Robert Vischer
has noted, proponents of aggressive lawyer advocacy commonly use the

45. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
46. FREEDMAN, ULE I, supra note 12, at 57. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 3.08, at 62 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter FREEDMAN & SMITH,
ULE IV]; Freedman, PersonalResponsibility, supra note 2, at 204. Other client-centered lawyers
also identify client autonomy as the primary focus of legal representation. See, e.g., BASTRESS &
HARBAUGH, supra note 18, at 256; BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 18, at
272; BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS Ill, supra note 18, at 318.
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term client dignity interchangeably with that of client autonomy.4 7 But
there are other important aspects of client dignity that might be in
tension with client autonomy, including community, responsibility,
friendship, love, and even vulnerability.48 Autonomy is commonly
perceived to be freedom from all of those things. But full human dignity
involves flourishing in all aspects of life, including one's relationships.
Autonomy is an important aspect, but only one aspect, of client dignity.
A constant focus on autonomy, freedom, and rights as the ends of
representation in the writings of Professor Freedman and other clientcentered counselors overshadows other aspects of client dignity.
Lawyers can undercut client dignity by controlling the representation,
but lawyers can also undercut client dignity by helping clients to do
something that is beneath their dignity.49
Context is important. Professor Freedman and other client-centered
lawyers write in the context of an increasingly me-first, individualistic,
materialistic culture that affects both clients and lawyers. They write to
lawyers, who are likely to find it in their economic advantage to
aggressively pursue client interests. Calls for moral discourse are likely
to be drowned out by the culture's call to "be good to yourself." 50
47. Robert IC Vischer, How Do Lawyers Serve Human Dignity?, U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1957845.
48. Id.(manuscript at 13-14) (citing GEORGE W. HARRIS, DIGNITY AND VULNERABILITY:
STRENGTH AND QUALITY OF CHARACTER 68-69 (1997)).

49. Id.(manuscript at 19 & n.101) (citing Herbert Spiegelberg, Human Dignity: A Challenge
to Contemporary Philosophy, in HUMAN DIGNITY: THIS CENTURY AND THE NEXT 54-55 (Rubin

Gotesky & Ervin Laszlo eds., 1970)).
50. Professor Freedman quotes my statement that the collaborative lawyer "engages in moral
conversation with the client but generally leaves decisions to the client." Freedman, supranote 7, at
352 (emphasis added) (quoting Cochran, supra note 4, at 691) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Professor Freedman wonders about the "generally." Id.As Professor Shaffer and I note in our text,
we believe that moral discourse will usually generate agreement between the lawyer and client, but
that there are times when the lawyer should refuse to join the client. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN,
supra note 3, at 26. "In our view, a lawyer should withdraw from representation when the client
wants her to do something that the lawyer believes to be morally wrong." Id.at 27. This appears to
be consistent with the position of both Professor Freedman and the Restatement (Third) of the Law
on the Law Governing Lawyers that withdrawal is permissible when the harm to other people from
the representation would be greater than the harm to the client from withdrawal. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 32(4) (1998); FREEDMAN & SMITH, ULE IV, supra note
46, § 3.09, at 66. That restriction on withdrawal was added to the Restatement (Third) after
Professor Freedman criticized an earlier draft that had no such limitation. See FREEDMAN & SMITH,
ULE IV, supra note 46, § 3.09, at 66 n. 110 (citing Monroe Freedman, ALl to Clients: Drop Dead!,
LEGAL TIMES, May 31, 1993, at 26).
Relatedly, Professor Freedman wonders whether I would withdraw from representing
Theodore Kaczynski, who objected to the insanity defense and thereby exposed himself to the death
penalty because the insanity defense would undercut his ecology advocacy. Freedman, supra note 7,
at 352. I would not. In my view, there are some principles worth dying for, and I would support
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I have long advocated that lawyers allow clients to control decisions
during legal representation. 5' In my Campbell Law Review speech, in
addition to criticizing client-centered lawyers for focusing on client
autonomy at the expense of other people, I criticized authoritarian
lawyers who control decisions during representation.5 2 In my earliest
legal ethics scholarship, I too used the term "autonomy" for my preferred
notion of client control.5 3 But I gave it up. The term "autonomy" is too
absolute. An autonomous person has no constraints. It suggests that
independence is always good, dependence always bad. But
dependence-on neighbors, on friends, on spouses, on parents, and on
children (increasingly, at my age)-can be among the greatest joys of
human life. And dependence on a lawyer, in the right circumstances, can
be a good thing. Lawyers should not start off with the objective to
"maximize" client autonomy. Whether the lawyer and client should
"4maximize" client autonomy should be the subject of the discussion
between them.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It may be too late in the day to hope that Professor Freedman will
break from the client-centered lawyers and join Professor Shaffer, me,
and others as a "collaborative counselor," in a school of client
counseling that better captures his call for lawyer-client moral discourse.
Short of a complete conversion, my hope is that Professor Freedman will
challenge the dominant client-centered position on this issue and seek
reform from within.5 4 Lawyer-client moral discourse should be an
integral part of legal representation.

Kaczynski's selection of the principles that he is willing to die for. I wonder whether Professor
Freedman would defer to James Louis Holland, who wanted to accept the death penalty rather than
risk getting a life sentence in a prison where he could not smoke. See State v. Holland, 876 P.2d
357, 360 n.3 (Utah 1994); Death Wish Shallow, DESERET NEWS (June 7, 1988, 12:00 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/6677/DEATH-WISH-SHALLOW.html. I would not. The right
to smoke is not a principle I would assist a client to die for.
51. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client
Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and
PursueAlternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 819, 830 (1990).
52. See Cochran, supra note 4, at 689-90.
53. See Cochran, supra note 51, at 830-33.
54. Professor Freedman's only critique thus far of the other client-centered counselors is to
note his (and Abbe Smith's) "concern" that they practice "quasi-therapeutic lawyering." FREEDMAN
& SMITH, ULE IV, supranote 46, § 3.04, at 51 (citing Ellmann, supra note 17, at 739).
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